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Why Investing in
Kids Makes Sense for
Local Economies
M

y recent book, Investing in Kids:
Early Childhood Programs and Local
Economic Development (Bartik [2011],
published by the Upjohn Institute),
makes the case for why an investment
in high-quality early childhood
programs will pay off in improved local
economic development. State and local
governments must take the lead for this
expanded public investment; the federal
government has other pressing concerns.

High-quality early
childhood programs will
result in a local economy with
more skilled labor, which
will attract more and better
jobs to the local economy.
Why is there a local payoff from
early childhood programs? Many child
participants in these programs will
remain in their home states or metro
areas for most of their working careers.
High-quality early childhood programs
will enhance the skills of these former
child participants. As a result, the local
economy will have more skilled labor,
which will attract more and better jobs
to the local economy. An increase in
the number and quality of jobs will
raise local per capita earnings, the most
important benefit of local economic

development. Although many policies
affect job skills, early childhood
programs deserve emphasis because of
good evidence for cost-effectiveness.
Investing in skills through early
childhood programs is an alternative to
traditional local economic development
policies. These traditional policies have
emphasized business tax incentives such
as property tax abatements. If successful,
such incentives boost labor demand.
The most important benefit of increased
labor demand is higher per capita local
earnings.
In contrast, early childhood programs
mainly work on the labor supply side
of the local economy. These programs
can increase local labor supply quality
because Americans are less mobile than
sometimes thought. About two-thirds of
Americans spend most of their working
careers in their childhood states (see
Figure 1). Over half spend most of their
working careers in their home metro
areas. These percentages do not decline
much for smaller or slower-growing
metro areas (Bartik 2009).
In an era of declining relative
communication and transportation costs,
businesses are increasingly free to locate
far from raw materials or markets. But
businesses need to be close to a supply
of skilled labor. “Business climate” is as
much affected by local labor force quality
as by business taxes.
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Figure 1 Percentage of U.S. Adults Living in Same State as at Birth or in
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NOTE: Data on percentages living in birth state are calculated by the author from the Public Use
Microdata Samples, 2000 census. Note that these figures are biased downward, probably about 6
percent, because of households listing location of hospital as state of birth, not residential location
of mother at time of birth. Data on percentages living in same state as at age 4 are calculated by the
author from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, Geocode version.

But why emphasize early childhood
programs when local labor supply quality
can be affected by K-12 education, job
training, or by attracting the “creative
class” (Florida 2002)? Early childhood
programs should be emphasized
because they have rigorous evidence
of effectiveness. A random assignment
experiment, the Perry Preschool Program,
shows that preschool can have large
effects on educational attainment and
adult earnings through age 40. A largescale preschool program, the Chicago
Child-Parent Center program, also
provides good evidence on preschool’s
long-term effectiveness in increasing
high school graduation rates. Shorterterm studies in at least seven states use
a rigorous “regression-discontinuity”
evaluation design to show that large-scale
state-funded pre-K programs can improve
kindergarten readiness.
Other early childhood programs also
have rigorous positive evaluations. The
Nurse-Family Partnership is a nurse
home visitation program that provides
services to first-time disadvantaged
mothers from the prenatal period to age
two, and seeks to improve prenatal care,
parenting, and the mom’s life course.
Experimental evidence shows that the
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program reduces juvenile crime. The
Abecedarian program, a full-time child
care and preschool program from birth
to age five, has evidence from a random
assignment experiment that it increases
employment of mothers and educational
attainment of former child participants.
We know more about the long-term
effects of early childhood programs than
about the long-term effects of 3rd grade.
It is impossible to randomly deny 3rd

Early childhood programs
should be emphasized
because they have rigorous
evidence of effectiveness.
grade to a child, whereas many random
assignment and other rigorous studies
have been done for early childhood
programs.
A reasonable question is how
it is possible for such limited-time
interventions in early childhood to
have large effects on adult outcomes.
As suggested by Nobel Prize–winning
economist James Heckman and others,
the answer seems to be effects of early
childhood programs on “soft skills”
(Heckman et al. 2010). Sometimes the

effects of early childhood programs on
“hard skills,” such as those measured
by reading and math tests, seem to fade
as students progress through the K-12
system. However, soft skill effects
of early childhood programs seem to
become more profound over time. Soft
skills include how the child interacts with
peers and teachers, the child’s ability to
plan, and the child’s self-confidence. A
more confident child with better peer and
teacher relationships will find such skills
rewarded during kindergarten, which
encourages further development of these
skills, and so on as the child continues
through school.
For early childhood programs to be
effective, these programs must be high
quality. But we know something about
how to create quality programs. For
preschool, class sizes must be reasonable,
the curriculum must engage the child in
active learning, and teachers must know
how to encourage learning without being
overly directive. For the Nurse-Family
Partnership program, we know that it
works better with nurse home visitors
than with paraprofessionals.
Based on studies of early childhood
programs, as well as estimates of how
many former child participants will
remain in the state, and based on the
effects of state labor quality on job
growth, I provide estimates in my
book for the ratio of state economic
development benefits to costs for three
early childhood programs. These state
economic development benefits are
the increased present value of state
residents’ per capita earnings. The three
early childhood programs are universal
pre-K for four-year-olds, the NurseFamily Partnership program, and the
Abecedarian program. Figure 2 shows
these estimates.
For comparison, the figure also shows
the ratio of economic development
benefits to costs for well-designed
business tax incentives. Ratios are
similar across all four programs: all these
programs increase state residents’ per
capita earnings by two to three times their
costs.
From a national perspective, early
childhood programs have larger
economic development benefits. These
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Figure 2 Ratio of Economic Development Benefits to Cost, State versus
National Perspective

Ratio of present value of benefits to costs
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broadly available.
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Note
This article contains many statements that
are not referenced due to space constraints.
For a complete bibliography, please see the
book, Investing in Kids.

References

0.0
Business
incentives

Universal pre-K

national benefits include the increased
earnings of former child participants who
move to other states. In contrast, business
tax incentives have smaller benefits from
a national perspective. Most of the state
benefits of business tax incentives are
due to state business activity that would
have otherwise occurred elsewhere in the
United States.
Furthermore, federal policy should
discourage states’ indiscriminate use
of business tax incentives. It should
encourage states’ investments in highquality early childhood programs.
However, the federal government
currently has a lot on its plate, with
budget deficit problems and challenges
from rising health care costs. Major
federal interventions with business tax
incentives or early childhood programs
seem politically unlikely. States are on
their own.
One political impediment to state
investment in early childhood programs
is the long-term nature of these economic
development benefits. Most of the
increased earnings per capita due to
early childhood programs only occur 20
or so years later, when the former child
participants enter the labor force.
However, some of these programs’
benefits for children may be increasingly
valued by parents. This parental valuation
may make it easier for businesses to

Abecedarian
program

Nurse-Family
Partnership

attract parents to a state offering highquality early childhood programs, and it
may also increase property values. For
example, we know that home values are
increased by higher elementary school
test scores. In the book, I calculate that
universal pre-K, due to its effects in
increasing elementary school test scores,
should raise local property values by
about 13 times the annual program costs
of providing universal pre-K.
There are historical precedents for
state initiatives to invest in expanded
education. The common school
movement of the nineteenth century,
along with the high school movement of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, were grassroots initiatives at
the state and local levels. These state and
local investments in expanded education
were in part motivated by the potential
short- and long-run economic benefits
for local communities. For example, in
1914, the Iowa Department of Public
Instruction made the following argument:
“The landlord who lives in town . . . may
well be reminded that when he offers his
farm for sale it will be to his advantage to
advertise, ‘free transportation to a good
graded school’” (quoted in Goldin and
Katz [2008], p. 193).
The idea of early childhood programs
as a spur to state and local economic
development is a powerful concept. The
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Carolyn J. Heinrich

The Performance of
Performance Standards
I

ncentives and accountability for
government performance have become
so central to contemporary government
reform agendas across the globe that
public management scholars have
proclaimed a new era of “government by
performance management” (Moynihan
and Pandey 2005, p. 422). Elements of
these recent reforms include establishing
performance measures and standards
to facilitate increased accountability
to the public, pay for performance,
organization-wide performance bonuses,
and competitive performance-based
contracting; reducing “red tape” and
promoting more transparent management;
and devolving government functions
and incentivizing innovation. A core
objective of incorporating performance
measures and standards into public
sector incentive systems is to create clear
expectations for government performance
(while loosening the reins of bureaucratic
control) and allow for overt assessment
of results. If they are to be more than
data collection exercises, however,
performance management systems
also need to incorporate a means for
incentivizing or rewarding individuals,
teams, or entire organizations for their
achievements relative to performance
goals.
In the United States, performance
standards systems and bonuses are (or
have been) used in Food Stamps and
welfare-to-work programs, employment
and training programs, child welfare
agencies and child support enforcement
programs, Medicaid and SCHIP
programs, and other social programs.
Performance incentive systems in public
bureaucracies are also advancing in
Europe and other parts of the world, with
some governments such as Australia
and the Netherlands now implementing
incentive systems with fully (100
percent) performance-contingent pay and
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contracting arrangements (Finn 2008;
Struyven and Steurs 2005) As the use
of performance measures and incentive
systems has expanded in the public
sector, so has the number of studies
calling attention to their challenges
and unintended effects, although there
is relatively little rigorous empirical
evidence of their implications for
government outcomes.
Among the earliest introductions
of incentive systems in government
agencies was the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) performance standards
system in 1982, described by Klerman
(2005, p. 347) as one of the “most mature
implementations of performance-based
management.” It is also one of the most
studied systems, in part because of the
randomized experimental evaluation
of the JTPA program that produced
important information for assessing
the performance of this performance
standards system. Policymakers have
looked to the results of these studies to
inform and guide changes in the design
and operation of performance standards
systems in other government programs,
as well as to improve these systems in
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA)
programs that replaced JTPA.
At the same time, one of the
motivations for assembling the research
presented in our new book, The
Performance of Performance Standards
(published by the Upjohn Institute),
is that despite decades of study and
practice, some of the important lessons
that have been learned do not appear to
be reflected in the current design and
implementation of performance standards
systems. Bevan and Hood (2006, p. 7),
for example, describe the development
and use of performance targets in the
English public health care system,
along with the perverse incentives they
generated, as “hitting the target and
missing the point.”

It may be that some of the empirical
evidence from past studies has not
been effectively communicated or
penetrated policymaking and public
management circles deeply enough. Or
it may be that some of the fundamental
lessons have been ignored or deferred
in pursuit of other objectives (political
or otherwise). Or, as James Heckman
and Jeffrey Smith comment, it may be
that policymakers who have mandated
such systems (and administrators
involved in their implementation) have
not fully appreciated the challenges of
designing a performance management
system that generates incentives for
improving performance and impacts.
For example, even if a government
designed a performance management
system that initially suggested a strong
correlation between performance
measures and desired outcomes, over
time, its effectiveness may decline as
program managers learn how to game
the measures and other limitations of
the measures and system design become
known.
The essays we present use U.S.
employment and training programs as a
“laboratory” for investigation. Drawing
on a variety of data sources on these
incentives systems, we explore how
performance standards and incentives
affect the behavior of public managers
and agency employees, their approaches
to service delivery, and ultimately, the
outcomes for participants. Both the
JTPA and WIA programs have allowed
state and local administrators and their
governing boards substantial discretion,
within broad limits, to determine
performance goals, standards, and bonus
systems. This administrative flexibility
is reflected in the range of incentive
systems that states have implemented
over time. It is this variation in incentive
systems among states that serves as the
grist for our empirical mill and is used to
extract general lessons that can be applied
on a wider scale to both existing and
newly developing performance incentive
systems.
In our investigation of formal
incentive structures and organizational
behavior within U.S. employment
and training programs, we focus
on the following questions that are
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broadly applicable to any public sector
performance management and incentive
system:
• How do performance standards
and measures operate to include or
exclude individuals with different
characteristics in public programs?
• How do performance standards and
measures affect the types of public
services offered and received?
• How do the processes for setting
standards and weights for
performance goals and for recognizing
and rewarding performance affect
system incentives and bureaucratic
responses?
• Are the performance standards,
measures, and incentives effective
in motivating bureaucratic behavior
toward the achievement of program
goals?
• Do short-term outcome measures used
in performance standards systems
predict long-term impacts of programs
on participants?
• What problems or unintended effects
are associated with the design and
implementation of performance
standards systems in the public sector?
• What other lessons do we learn from
the implementation of performance
standards systems and the variation in
rules and guidelines governing their
administration over time?
In undertaking research to address
the questions above, we were fortunate
to have access to data superior in scope
and detail to much of the data used in
the existing literature or available on
a regular basis for assessing program
performance. Our research benefitted
from detailed longitudinal, microlevel
data that were collected in the National
JTPA Study (NJS) and through other
administrative data sources. In addition,
we collected and analyzed complete
information about state-level variation in
the JTPA and WIA performance standards
systems. We show that state incentive
systems are highly complex and differ
widely across states and over time within
states, and are not easily characterized
by small dimensional summary measures
as used in previous studies. This wealth
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of data, to which we applied a variety of
analytical/empirical strategies, is essential
in assessing the implications of features
and changes in performance standards
and incentive systems in different
contexts and across time.
The broad findings and lessons that we
draw from this research are as follows.
First, individuals and organizations
respond to incentives, but sometimes
the responses are perverse. In the first
iteration of a performance standards
system’s design, well-meaning designers
of the system are unlikely to fully
anticipate the responses of program
administrators and frontline workers to
system incentives, or the many possible
ways they might influence measured
performance without necessarily adding
to (or possibly even detracting from)
program value or impact. Incentive
system designers will have to expect
to regularly review and revise the rules
and incentives they create if they want
to avoid inefficient and unintended
responses.
Second, the short-term outcome
measures that are commonly used in
performance standards systems are
only weakly related to the true long-run
impacts of the programs. Researchers
and policymakers have yet to identify
performance measures that will promote
key, long-term program objectives while
simultaneously generating more readily
available performance information for
ongoing program management. This will
continue to be one of the most vexing
challenges for performance standards
system designers for some time to come.
Third, the “cream-skimming” issue,
or concern about the trade-off between
efficiency and equity in access to
programs, has been overstated. While
there is some evidence of a trade-off
between serving the most disadvantaged
and allocating program resources most
efficiently, it appears to be modest at
best. Personal choices and informational
constraints play a more important
role in accounting for demographic
differences in program participation
than administrative discretion, and thus,
program administrators should consider
investing more in increasing awareness
among the eligible population.

Clearly, demand on the part of
policymakers or the public for greater
accountability and a results-oriented
government is not diminishing.
The design and implementation of
performance standards and incentive
systems in the public sector will continue
to be a dynamic pursuit, and it is our hope
that the lessons distilled in this volume
will have a role in shaping and speeding
their evolution, as well as in ultimately
improving government performance.
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Randall W. Eberts

When Will the Labor
Market Recover?

6

more cyclical change. The restructuring
and downsizing of the auto industry
and the real estate slump and its effect
on construction are two examples of
regionally concentrated restructuring.
Typically, workers would respond to these
conditions by moving to areas with better
job prospects, but decline in housing
values, leading to negative home equity
and foreclosures for many households,
reduces their ability to do so. An additional
factor is the increasing duration of
unemployment, with studies showing that
the longer duration of unemployment the
harder it is to get a job.
Several organizations offer various
scenarios for the recovery of the labor
market. For instance, the Congressional
Budget Office expects the unemployment
rate to decline to 7.96 percent in 2012
and the participation rate to increase to
64.8 percent. This requires an average job
growth of 227,000 per month over the
next two years—about twice the current
rate and slightly under the 2006 average
rate 268,000 per month. Using the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s recent
forecast of employment growth in 2011
of 170,000 jobs per month and extending

Randall W. Eberts is president of the Upjohn
Institute.

Figure 1 Job Openings, New Hires, Separations, and Unemployed (in 000s)
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lthough it has been nearly two years
since the Great Recession of 2007 was
officially declared over, we are still waiting
for jobs to recover. More than 9.0 million
people joined the ranks of the unemployed
during the 18-month recession—the worst
since the Great Depression, bringing the
total number of unemployed to nearly 16
million. While real GDP is currently within
one percent of its prerecession peak, total
private employment is still nearly 6 percent
below the employment peak of December
2007.
Productivity gains drove the early stages
of the recovery, which did little to increase
employment and reduce unemployment.
Productivity gains have slowed recently,
and have even turned negative, so it could
be that the rest of the expansion may be
driven by increases in hours and hiring. If
so, the relative strength of the employment
recovery is determined by two factors: the
number of new job openings created and
how quickly the unemployed can move
into these new positions. During the first
16 months of the recovery, job openings
increased 39 percent, which is nearly
double the increase in job openings during
the previous expansion after the 2001
recession. Job openings increased from
2.3 million per month to 3.3 million per
month. However, hiring has remained flat,
increasing by only 3.6 percent. (See Figure
1.)
How can job openings be increasing so
much faster than new hires? Obviously,
new openings are going unfilled, but
why? First, workers may not qualify for
the new positions because their skills
don’t match the job requirements. This
is referred to as an increase in structural
unemployment. Workers displaced from a
declining industry may have to search in
another industry that has job opportunities
yet their skills may not easily transfer
to that industry. This view is somewhat
controversial, however, with several
studies pointing to less structural and

Openings, hires, separations

A

that rate forward paints a bleaker picture.
The Upjohn Institute calculates that at that
pace the unemployment rate would not
come down to 8 percent until the end of
2015. In order to return to the prerecession
average unemployment rate of 4.8 percent
by 2014, the economy would have to
generate 338,000 jobs each month. It’s
not impossible, but monthly growth rates
of this magnitude have occurred only in
short spurts, and these estimates require
sustained growth rates at this level.
Some economists believe that returning
to the days of unemployment rates below
5 percent may not be in our future, at least
not in the short run. They believe that the
recession has caused the long-run natural
unemployment rate to be higher than in the
past, for the reasons just discussed.
The recession has left the United States
with a weak employment situation. Job
openings are picking up, but hires are
flat, and the labor market is less dynamic
than before, with fewer job openings and
separations—a measure of labor market
churning and flexibility. If job openings
continue to increase and the structural
changes are minimal, then the rest of 2011
may see a more substantial rebound in
employment than many expected a few
months ago, when the unemployment was
hovering above 10 percent. Yet, it may take
at least several more years beyond 2011
before the labor market situation resembles
what it was before the recession.

New and Recent Books
The Performance
of Performance
Standards
James J. Heckman, Carolyn J. Heinrich,
Pascal Courty, Gerald Marschke, and
Jeffrey Smith, editors

Investing in Kids
Early Childhood Programs and
Local Economic Development
Timothy J. Bartik

Incentives and accountability for
government performance are central to
contemporary
government
reform agendas
across the globe.
Still, the lessons
on intended and
unintended effects
of incentive and
performance
management
systems from
several decades of research and practice
do not appear to be reflected in the
current design and implementation of
these systems in the public sector.
This conundrum serves as motivation
for the contributors to this new volume.
Led by Nobel laureate James J.
Heckman, they use U.S. employment
and training programs as their laboratory
for investigation into the performance
of performance standards. Drawing on
a variety of superior data sources, they
explore how performance standards
and incentives influence the behavior of
public managers and agency employees,
their approaches to service delivery, and
ultimately, the outcomes for participants.
As demand for greater accountability
and a results-oriented government
continues to grow, the design and
implementation of performance
standards and incentive systems in
the public sector will continue to be a
dynamic pursuit. The lessons contained
in this volume provide direction for
policymakers seeking to shape and speed
their evolution, as well as in ultimately
improving government performance.

“State and local economic
development officials need new
strategies, ones backed by fact and
evidence. Tim Bartik provides exactly
this in his
powerfully
researched book
that documents
the link between
economic
development
and investing
in your children
in ways never
done before.
Now business leaders and development
officials have a sober, fact-based
framework for increasing personal
incomes, local and state workforce
competitiveness, and national fiscal
strength. This is a framework for getting
our country back on its feet and keeping
it there.”
–Robert Dugger, founder and managing
partner of Hanover Investment Group;
chairman of the advisory board,
Partnership for America’s Economic
Success
“Tim Bartik has written a
thoughtful book on the value of a local
approach to financing and creating
early interventions to foster child
development. The economic case for
supplementing the early environments
of disadvantaged children is compelling.
Annual rates of return of 7–10 percent
per annum have been estimated—higher
than return on stocks over the period
1945–2008 . . . In an era of stringent
federal budgets, Bartik offers a plan
for raising the support needed to put
effective programs into place.”
–James Heckman, Nobel Prize–winning
economist, University of Chicago

329 pp. $42 cloth 978-0-88099-294-7
$22 paper 978-0-88099-292-3. 2011.

417 pp. $45 cloth 978-0-88099-373-9
$20 paper 978-0-88099-372-2. 2011.

What Works in
Work-First Welfare
Designing and Managing
Employment Programs
in New York City
Andrew R. Feldman
“The most important contributions
of this book . . . are its insights into
what distinguishes the most successful
work-first
programs from
those that
have less-good
placement and
retention rates.
Increasing the
effectiveness
of employment
programs is
important
bbeyond
d th
the narrow confines of
the welfare system. Even after the
economy recovers . . . many will
remain unemployed and out of the
labor force, in need of whatever help
the employment services system can
provide . . . The findings and insights
in this book should be taken seriously
by both designers and managers of
employment programs, whether or
not they are in New York City or are
connected to a welfare system . . . It
is crucial that we continue to learn
from ongoing comparative evaluations
as well as from studies of specific
strategies and approaches. This book,
I believe, is a fine example of the kind
of learning that we need to be engaged
in.”
–Mary Jo Bane, Harvard University
183 pp. $40 cloth 978-0-88099-376-0
$18 paper 978-0-88099-375-3. 2011.

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686

Nonprofit Org.
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
Kalamazoo MI
Permit No. 756

ORDER FORM
Book/Author

Qty Cloth

The Performance of Performance Standards
Heckman et al., eds.

To order a publication or request a catalog, mail
phone, fax or e-mail:
Qty Paper

Total Price

___ @ $42

___ @ $22

__________

Investing in Kids
Bartik

___ @ $45

___ @ $20

__________

What Works in Work-First Welfare
Feldman

___ @ $40

___ @ $18

__________

W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
Toll-free (888) 227-8569
Phone (269) 343-4330
Fax (269) 343-7310
E-mail: publications@upjohn.org

Subtotal $ __________
Shipping/Handling
U.S.A. and Canada: $5.00 first book, $1.00 each additional book.
Elsewhere: $6.00 first book, $1.50 each additional book.

Plus Shipping $ __________
TOTAL $ ___________

SHIP TO:

Name
Address

___ check enclosed
___ VISA
___ Mastercard
___ P. O. # ________________________

Organization
City

State

PAYMENT: All orders must include check, credit
card information, or purchase order. Checks must
be payable to the W.E. Upjohn Institute in U.S.
funds drawn on a U.S. bank. All prices are subject
to change without notice.

Zip
signature

BILL TO: (Must attach purchase order)

credit card #
Name

Organization
expiration date

Address

City

State

Zip
phone

April 2011

